A DEAD-ON-ARRIVAL NULLITY: GLOBAL LEGAL CONSORTIUM DEMOLISHES OMOTOSHO FOR TURNING AN UNAUTHORISED AIDE’S MEMO INTO A 20-YEAR SENTENCE





Justice James Omotosho’s May 8, 2025, judgment in MultiChoice Nigeria Ltd v. Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (FCCPC) has become the subject of fresh legal criticism over his handling of the case involving detained Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) leader, Mazi Nnamdi Kanu.

In Part 9 of his 150-part legal commentary series, Onyedikachi Ifedi, Esq., of the Global Legal Consortium, examines what he describes as a contradiction between Justice Omotosho’s interpretation of statutory authority in the MultiChoice case and his handling of the IPOB proscription proceedings.

Titled “Omotosho’s Ninth Jurisdictional Failure — The MultiChoice Hypocrisy: How a Trial Judge Murdered His Own Precedent, Validated an Unauthorised Coup-Style Proscription, and Gagged Final Addresses to Conceal Judicial Fraud,” the commentary argues that the judge applied strict requirements for presidential authorisation in the commercial dispute but failed to apply the same standard to the IPOB proscription order.

According to Ifedi, the central issue is whether former President Muhammadu Buhari personally approved the application that led to IPOB’s proscription in 2018.

Abba Kyari Was Not the President: The Question of Presidential Approval

A major part of Ifedi’s argument concerns Section 2(1)(c) of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011, as amended in 2013.

The lawyer maintains that the provision required personal presidential approval as a condition that had to be satisfied before an application to proscribe an organisation could be brought before the Federal High Court.

He draws attention to the memorandum submitted by the Federal Government during the IPOB proscription proceedings, which reportedly bears the signature of Abba Kyari, former Chief of Staff to President Muhammadu Buhari.

Ifedi argues that Kyari was neither the President nor the statutory approving authority identified by the provision. He therefore questions whether his signature could legally substitute for the approval required from the President.

In his words:

“Abba Kyari was not the President. He was not the statutory approving authority under Section 2(1)(c) of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act. The memorandum produced by the Federal Government bears Kyari’s signature, not Buhari’s. The government cannot substitute the signature of an administrative aide for the presidential approval expressly required by the legislature.”

The lawyer also invokes the legal principle delegatus non potest delegare, which generally means that a person entrusted with a specific authority cannot transfer that authority to another person without lawful permission.

According to Ifedi, an executive aide cannot automatically exercise a statutory power reserved for the President simply because of his position within the Presidency.

He consequently maintains that the memorandum signed by Kyari did not satisfy the statutory requirement for presidential approval.

Ifedi also questions the role of Justice Abdul Kafarati, who granted the IPOB proscription application in 2018. He argues that the court’s acceptance of the memorandum could not cure what he considers an absence of the mandatory presidential authorisation.

In his view, a judicial order cannot acquire a valid legal foundation where a mandatory statutory condition for the proceedings was not fulfilled.

MultiChoice Judgment: The Alleged Contradiction in Omotosho’s Reasoning

Ifedi describes Justice Omotosho’s judgment in the MultiChoice case as the strongest basis for questioning the judge’s approach to the IPOB proscription matter.

In the May 8, 2025, judgment, the court considered Section 88 of the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act 2018, which provides for presidential authority to regulate the prices of goods and services under specified conditions.

According to the commentary, Justice Omotosho held that the FCCPC could investigate exploitative pricing practices and submit its findings and recommendations to the President but could not independently exercise presidential price-fixing powers without the required authorisation.

The court also reportedly held that where the President exercises the relevant price-regulation power, the required declaration must be made through an order published in the Federal Gazette.

For Ifedi, the significance of the judgment extends beyond the commercial dispute between MultiChoice and the FCCPC.

He argues that the decision established the importance of strict compliance with statutory requirements whenever legislation assigns a particular power to a designated constitutional authority.

The lawyer then draws a comparison with the IPOB proscription proceedings, arguing that the same standard of statutory compliance should have been applied when the Federal Government sought to proscribe the organisation.

He questions why a memorandum bearing Abba Kyari’s signature was accepted as sufficient presidential approval in the IPOB matter, while the FCCPC was restricted from exercising a power assigned to the President without the necessary authorisation.

Ifedi describes the difference as selective application of the law, maintaining that statutory requirements should not be strictly enforced in a commercial dispute but overlooked in proceedings affecting the liberty and fundamental rights of an individual.

Refusal to Allow Final Address: A Fair Hearing Controversy

Another major issue raised in the commentary is the refusal to allow Kanu’s defence to present a final written address during the criminal proceedings.

Ifedi describes the decision as a violation of Kanu’s constitutional right to fair hearing. He argues that the defence should have been given an opportunity to address the court before judgment was delivered.

According to the lawyer, a final written address would have allowed Kanu’s legal team to draw attention to Justice Omotosho’s earlier judgment in the MultiChoice case and use its reasoning to challenge the legal foundation of the IPOB proscription order.

The commentary raises a central question:

How could a decision taken without the required presidential authorisation be treated as a nullity in the MultiChoice case in May 2025, while the alleged absence of similar authorisation was not treated as a defect in the IPOB proscription proceedings that formed part of the case against Kanu?

Ifedi argues that the defence should have been allowed to place this alleged contradiction before the court and that the judge should have addressed the issue on the official record.

He further alleges that refusing the defence an opportunity to present its final written address prevented it from fully advancing an argument that could have challenged the legal basis of the proceedings.

The lawyer characterises the development as an attempt to prevent the defence from relying on the judge’s earlier pronouncement. However, that allegation remains his interpretation of the court’s decision.

Operation Python Dance II and the Alleged Human Rights Consequences

The commentary also examines what Ifedi describes as the wider human rights consequences of the IPOB proscription order, particularly its alleged impact on Biafran youths across the South-East.

He links the order to the security operations that followed the military’s launch of Operation Python Dance II in September 2017.

According to Ifedi, the proscription order became a justification used by security agencies during operations involving alleged shootings, torture, arbitrary arrests and detention of young people across Igboland.

He maintains that thousands of Biafran youths suffered the consequences of these operations and argues that an order he considers legally defective cannot provide justification for violations of fundamental human rights.

The lawyer further emphasises that no court order, whether valid or otherwise, gives security agencies the authority to disregard Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Chapter IV guarantees fundamental rights, including the right to life, personal liberty, dignity of the human person and fair hearing.

Ifedi argues that security agencies cannot rely on a proscription order to justify unlawful shootings, torture, arbitrary arrests or the killing of individuals without trial.

He also maintains that even where an organisation has been lawfully proscribed, its members and other individuals do not automatically lose their constitutional protections.

For him, the alleged failure to obtain the required presidential approval raises broader questions about the legality of the proscription process and accountability for security operations across the South-East.

Conclusion: Ifedi Says Omotosho’s MultiChoice Judgment Raises Questions for the Appeal

In his concluding arguments, Ifedi maintains that Justice James Omotosho’s May 8, 2025, judgment in MultiChoice Nigeria Ltd v. FCCPC raises serious questions about the reasoning applied in the IPOB proscription proceedings.

He argues that the principle that an action taken without the required statutory authorisation may be a nullity should also be considered in relation to the proscription order.

According to the lawyer, Justice Kafarati’s 2018 decision could not cure the alleged absence of mandatory presidential approval, just as the passage of time could not automatically validate an order that was defective from inception.

Ifedi further insists that Abba Kyari’s signature could not replace President Buhari’s approval if the relevant legislation expressly required the President to exercise that authority personally.

He also maintains that denying Kanu the opportunity to present a final written address did not eliminate the legal questions surrounding the proscription order or prevent the defence from challenging the foundation of the proceedings.

The lawyer expresses confidence that the issues raised in his commentary could become significant grounds for consideration by the Court of Appeal.

He concludes that a conviction founded on a proscription order that failed to satisfy mandatory statutory requirements should be set aside by the appellate court.

The commentary ends with the following declaration:

“STATUTORY POWERS BELONG EXCLUSIVELY TO THE AUTHORITY NAMED BY THE LEGISLATURE. AN AIDE’S SIGNATURE IS NOT PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL. GAGGING FINAL ADDRESSES CANNOT HIDE JUDICIAL HYPOCRISY. A PROSCRIPTION BUILT ON AN UNSATISFIED STATUTORY CONDITION IS A CORPSE IN LAW—AND ANY CONVICTION BUILT UPON IT IS DOOMED AT THE COURT OF APPEAL.”

Onyedikachi Ifedi, Esq.
For: Global Legal Consortium

This is Part 9 of a 150-part legal commentary series examining what the author describes as jurisdictional failures in the proceedings involving Mazi Nnamdi Kanu.


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